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NOTES
Non-Union Member Complaints to
Calculation of Agency Shop Fees:
Arbitration or Judicial Relief?.
Air Line Pilots Ass 'n v. Miller'

I. INTRODUCTION
"Free rider" problems plague any group or association that provides general
benefits for its participants. Members may pay a fee, but nonmembers can reap the
benefits without expenditure. Labor unions address this disparity through the use of
agency shop fees contained in collective bargaining agreements. These fee
agreements call for those employees who choose not to join the union to pay their
share of the costs of collective bargaining. Labor unions have developed extensive
mechanisms in order to calculate the amount of the fee. Employees, who do not
want to subsidize activities they do not support, can file complaints with the union
to protest the calculation and collection of the agency fee. In order to protect the
interests of the objecting nonmember, the United States Supreme Court ordered
unions to develop internal remedies, usually in the form of arbitration, to address
these complaints. This Casenote addresses the effect of a union's arbitration remedy
for agency fee complaints on an employee's right to pursue judicial remedies of his
claim. The union argues that if it must develop the internal remedy, it should be
allowed to insist that workers pursue it before seeking a judicial remedy. Prior to the
instant decision, the Supreme Court had not taken up the issue. However, six federal
circuits have addressed this question. Four circuits held that workers were not
required to pursue the union remedy first.' Two circuits sided with the union and
required exhaustion of the union's remedy before pursuit in court.' Certiorari was
granted in this case to provide a definitive answer to this issue.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA") is a private sector labor
organization, which acts as exclusive bargaining agent for Delta Air Lines

1. 523 U.S. 866 (1998).
2. See Knight v. Kenai Peninsula Borough Sch. Dist., 131 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Bromley v. Michigan Educ. Ass'n, 82 F.3d 686 (6th Cir.
1996); Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1992).
3. See Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 76 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996); Hudson v. Chicago
Teachers Union, 922 F.2d 1306 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1230 (1991).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1999, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 1999, No. 2
("Delta").4 In November 1991, the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")
between these two parties was amended to include an agency shop clause. 5 In
December 1991, five Delta pilots filed suit against ALPA and Delta in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming the agency shop clause
was facially unlawful.6 The pilots sought an injunction to enjoin enforcement of the
clause, which was denied.7 Beginning in January 1992, the agency fees were
collected from nonmembers.' The pilots amended their complaint in October 1992,
to challenge the calculation of the agency shop fees.9 The pilots argued that "ALPA
had overstated the percentage of its expenditures genuinely attributable to 'germane'
activities."' The facial challenge to the agency shop clause was decided in favor of
the union on sumnary judgment, leaving the calculation of the fee as the sole issue
in the suit."
Under ALPA's "Policies and Procedures Applicable to Agency Fees," any
objectors to the fee calculation may request arbitration under procedures established
2
by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").' When the 1992 SGNE was
3
The union forwarded
union.'
with
the
published, 174 Delta pilots filed objections
the objections to the AAA; and in October 1993, the AAA assigned an arbitrator to
resolve all of the objections in a consolidated action.'4 The respondent-objectors
preferred to challenge the agency fee calculation in federal court and asked the AAA
to suspend the arbitration proceeding. 5 The arbitrator declined to suspend the
proceedings; the district court rejected a motion to enjoin the arbitration; and the
6
The
objector's counsel entered a conditional appearance in7 the arbitration.
calculation.'
fee
agency
the
upheld
substantially
arbitrator
Based on the arbitrator's decision, ALPA moved for summary judgment in the
district court action.' The district court granted the motion, ruling that the pilots

4. Miller, 523 U.S. at 869.
5. Id. The agency shop clause required each pilot not belonging to ALPA "to pay the [ulnion a
monthly service charge as a contribution for the administration of [the collective bargaining agreement l
and the representation of such employee." Id.
Delta pilots intervened in the action and Delta and two pilots were
6. Id. One-hundred and fifty
dismissed from the action. Thus, 153 Delta pilots were plaintiffs in the suit against the remaining
defendant, ALPA. Id. at 869-70.
7. Id. at 870.
8. Id. Members of the union were required to pay monthly dues equal to 2.35 percent of their
earnings. In calculating the fees owed by non-members, the union prepared a Statement of Germane and
Nongermane Expenses ("SGNE"). The union concluded that "19 percent of ALPA's expenses for that
year were not germane to collective bargaining. Accordingly, the union adjusted fees charged
nonmembers to equal 81 percent of the amount members paid." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The pilots did not challenge the granting of the summary judgment motion on appeal. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Ninety-one of the 153 plaintiffs in the district court action filed objections with ALPA. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 871.
16. Id.
17. Id. The arbitrator did conclude that "nongermane" expenses made up 21.49 percent of the union's
budget, instead of 19 percent. Id.
18. Id.
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were required to exhaust arbitral remedies before moving to federal court.' 9 The
ninety-one plaintiffs involved in the arbitration were "qualified for clear-error review
of the arbitrator's fact findings and de novo review of all legal issues."20 For these
plaintiffs, the district court upheld the arbitrator's decision. 2' The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding .that the
objectors were not required to arbitrate agency fee calculations unless they
specifically agreed to do so, which they had not.22 Thus, the arbitrator's decision had
no bearing on this case, and the court of appeals remanded.23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of
"whether an objector must exhaust a union provided arbitration process before
'
bringing an agency fee challenge in federal court."24
The Supreme Court held that
when objections are raised to the calculation of agency shop fees, the objectors
cannot be compelled to exhaust arbitration remedies before bringing
claims in
2
federal court, unless the objector has specifically agreed to do so. 1

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Labor law history in the United States has focused on the protection of
employees' rights. 26 "The primary protector of employees' rights have been labor
unions; and, as these unions have developed and grown, employees gradually have
been able to attain better wages, hours, and working conditions. 27 Often, however,
an employee will choose not to become a member of the union. The "free rider"
problem arises in these instances because the union represents all employees in the
field, regardless of whether they choose to join.2 The interests of both the union and
the nonmember are legitimate. On the one hand, the union is concerned with the
lack of support on the part of nonmembers who are able to enjoy the benefits of
collective representation.20 On the other hand, "nonunion member employees are
concerned with their rights in the context of being compelled to support the union. '
To address the problem of "free riders," unions developed an agency shop
arrangement. This arrangement provides that "a union which is the exclusive
representative of a group of employees for the purposes of collective bargaining may
charge employees who are not members of the union a fee to defray the costs of

19. Id. The 62 plaintiffs who were not a part of the arbitration were bound by the arbitrator's
decision. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 871-72.
25. Id. at 879-80.
26. Charles J. Ogeka, Respecting Nonunion Member Employees" Rights While Avoiding a Free Ride,
Lehnert v. FerrisFacultyAss'n, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 349, 349 (1992).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 349-50.
29. Id. at 350.
30. Id.
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acting as their collective bargaining representative."31 Beginning in 1956, the United
States Supreme Court took up the constitutionality of the agency shop fees charged
by the union against nonmembers.
In Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson,32 nonmembers of a railroad
union brought suit to enjoin enforcement and application of a union shop agreement
under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA").33 Their principal claim was that "the union
shop agreement forces men into ideological and political associations which violate
their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought
protected by the Bill of Rights. 34 The Court rejected these First Amendment claims,
finding there was no infringement or impairment of rights. 5 "The requirement for
financial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits
of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does
not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments."36 In InternationalAss 'n of
Machinists v. Street,3 7 the Court again took up the constitutionality of a union shop
agreement authorized by the RLA. Investigations led to the discovery that fees paid
by nonmembers had been used "to finance the campaigns of candidates for federal
and state offices whom [the plaintiffs] opposed, and to promote the propagation of
political and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which [they]
disagreed."3
The Court recognized that this discovery presented serious
constitutional problems; however, it decided the case upon other less controversial
grounds.39
More than fifteen years later, the Supreme Court took up the issue again in
Abood v. Detroit Boardof Education.40 In this public sector case, the union and the
school board executed an agency shop agreement, where the union charged
nonmembers a fee equal to the regular union dues.4' Union membership was not
required, but failure to pay the non-member shop fee resulted in discharge from
employment. 42 The plaintiffs alleged that the union spent the money on programs
"economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which
[p]laintiffs do not approve and in which they will have no voice, and which are not
and will not be collective bargaining activities. 43 The Court drew a distinction,
implicit in the earlier decisions of Hanson and Street, between permissible agency
shop fees for expenses related to collective bargaining and impermissible agency
shop fees for expenses related to political activity. 44 Under the Court's decisions in

31. Tim A. Thomas, Validity of Union Proceduresfor Fixing and Reviewing Agency Fees of
Nonunion Employees UnderPublic Employees Representation Contract - Post-Hudson Cases, 92 A.L.R.
FED.893,894 (1989).
32. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
33. Id. at 227.
34. Id. at 236.
35. Id. at 238.
36. Id.
37. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
38. Id. at 744.
39. Id. at 770.
40. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
41. Id. at 212.
42. Id.
43. Id. at213.
44. Id. at 222-23.
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Hanson and Street, the use of nonmember dues to finance collective bargaining,
contract administration, and grievance adjustment is constitutional and a permissible
use of agency fees.45 Likewise, a union is free to support any political causes of its
own choosing, but the monetary support for these causes must come from employees
that freely choose to join the union and who are not in any way compelled to become
members. 46 The Court also addressed remedies for disagreements stemming from
agency shop fees. "[I)t would be highly desirable for unions to adopt a 'voluntary
plan by which dissenters would be afforded an internal union remedy." 4 7 Such a
remedy had been developed by the union in this case. 4' The Court held that, under
Michigan law, it might be appropriate to suspend judicial proceedings until internal
remedies were pursued and completed.4
In Ellis v. Brotherhoodof Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,5" the Court
undertook a detailed analysis of the chargeability of certain expenses under an RLAcontrolled agency shop agreement. The plaintiffs in this case, nonmembers of the
union, objected to six specific Union expenses they were forced to support under the
agency fee.5" In considering the legality of various charges assessed to nonmembers,
the Court set forth the test for union expenditures. "[T]he test must be whether the
challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of
performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with
the employer on labor-management issues."52
Two years later, the Court decided Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.53 In this
public sector case, nonmember employees challenged the agency fee procedures
adopted by the union.54 The question presented was whether the procedure set out
in the agency shop agreement for making objections to the agency fee was adequate
to protect the distinction, drawn in Abood, between permissible and impermissible
chargeable expenses. 5 In analyzing the procedures adopted by the union in this
case, the Court set forth three procedural requirements for nonmember employees
who object to the calculation of the agency fee. First, "'[t]he union should not be
permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a
procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even temporarily,
to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.' 56 The funds
reasonably in dispute must be held in escrow while challenges to their calculation are
being conducted.57 Second, potential objectors must be given information sufficient

45. Id. at 225-26.
46. Id. at 235-36.
47. Id. at 240 (quoting Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122
(1962)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 242.
50. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
51. Id. at 439-40.
52. Id. at 448.
53. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
54. Id. at 297-98.
55. Id. at 302.
56. Id. at 305 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 244).
57. Id. at 310.
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to determine whether the fee charged is proper." "Leaving the nonunion employees
in the dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee--and requiring them to
object in order to receive information--does not adequately protect the careful
distinctions drawn in Abood."59 The third requirement imposed by the court is one
not flowing from any previous case. The union must "provide for a reasonably
prompt decision by an impartial decision maker." 6 "The nonunion employee, whose
First Amendment rights are affected by the agency shop itself and who bears the
burden of objecting, is entitled to have his objections addressed in an expeditious,
fair, and objective manner."' Justice White, concurring with the majority opinion,
wrote that once the union has complied with the procedural requirements set forth
in the opinion,
the employee should be required to pursue arbitration before suing
62
in Court.
Six years later, the Court had before it the case of Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty
Ass 'n.63 The plaintiffs in this public sector case objected to certain uses of their
agency fee by the unions. The agency fee charged to nonmembers was equivalent
to that paid by union members. 64 Beginning with Hanson, the Court looked at its
previous decisions in order to establish guidelines for determining which activities
a union may compel nonmembers to subsidize. "[C]hargeable activities must (1) be
'germane' to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital
policy interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly add
to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or
union shop."65
One aspect of this area not addressed by the majority opinions of the United
States Supreme Court is the effect of intemal union remedies, such as arbitration, in
the agency shop agreements and whether these remedies preclude bringing suit first
or simultaneously in court. "The courts have had no small difficulty untying the
Gordian knot binding the judicial and nonjudicial procedures for challenging the
germaneness of agency shop assessments. ' 66
Six circuits have ruled on this issue. Four circuits, including the Third, Sixth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits ruled that an objecting employee is not required to pursue
the union's remedy first before proceeding in court. Two circuits, including the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits, required exhaustion of the union's remedy.
In Hohe v. Casey,67 nonmembers brought suit against a public union under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") challenging the union's fair share fee. 68 The provision
allowing for the fee also contained a clause stating that disputes over the fee would

58. Id. at 306.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 307.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 311.
63. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
64. Id.at 512.
65. Id. at 519.
66. Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 76 F.3d 1509, 1521 (10th Cir. 1996).
67. 956 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1992).
68. Id. at 402. "42 U.S.C. § 1983 recognizes a cause of action against any person who, acting under
color of law, subjects another to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution." Bromley v.
Michigan Educ. Ass'n, 82 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 1996).
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be resolved by an arbitrator whose decision was final and binding. 69 The Third
Circuit ruled that this clause was unconstitutional. It was inconsistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Patsy v. Boardof Regents,7 ° which held that "exhaustion
of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing
an action pursuant to § 1983."' The union argued that the Hudson provisions would
not be needed if employees could first pursue judicial remedy, but the court rejected
this argument.7 2 Hudson requires that the union must provide alternatives to
litigation, "it did not conclude that states or unions could require nonmembers to
arbitrate constitutional issues. 73
The Sixth Circuit addressed the question in Bromley v. Michigan Education
Ass 'n.74 The plaintiffs in this public sector case were not members of the union
which collectively represented public school teachers in Michigan. 7' After an
arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of the union's calculation of the agency fee,
the plaintiffs filed claims under § 1983.76 The question in this case was the effect of
the arbitrator's decision on the § 1983 action. First, the court recognized that "the
statutory right to have an Article IlIcourt adjudicate suits brought pursuant to § 1983
for vindication of rights secured by the First Amendment of the Constitution cannot
be foreclosed by non-statutory arbitration conducted by a privately appointed
decision-maker." 77 Although the arbitration remedy provided for in the agency shop
agreement is in compliance with the requirements set forth in Hudson, this does not
preclude any remedies meant to be provided by § 1983.78 Under Hudson, the
arbitrator's decision is not given preclusive effect in a subsequent § 1983 action;
however, that is not to say it should be accorded no weight at all.79 "The weight to
be accorded such a decision depends, however, on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case."' Second, the Sixth Circuit rejected any argument that plaintiffs
must exhaust arbitration remedies before proceeding to federal court. "[O]ur own
court has squarely rejected the proposition that it is constitutional for an agency shop
agreement to require objecting employees to exhaust their arbitration remedies
before going into court on their constitutional claims.'
Siding with the Sixth and Third Circuit is the Ninth Circuit in Knight v. Kenai
82
Plaintiffs, public school teachers, were
Peninsula Borough School District.
nonmembers challenging the union's compliance with the Hudson requirements
under § 1983.8 The Ninth Circuit had not previously ruled on the issue of whether

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Hohe, 956 F.2d at 406.
457 U.S. 496 (1982).
Id. at 516.
Hohe, 956 F.2d at 409.
Id.
82 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 694.
131 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 809-10.
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nonmembers must exhaust their arbitration remedies under the agency shop
agreement before seeking relief in federal court.8 4 The court, therefore, focused on
the circuits that have adopted an exhaustion requirement and found three reasons
those circuits adopted such a requirement. First, if the union complies with the
requirements in Hudson and provides for arbitration, it should be allowed to insist
that the arbitration remedy be pursued first.85 Second, without an exhaustion
requirement, the Hudson guidelines would be a waste of time and money. 6 Third,
"requiring exhaustion would lead to federal courts being 'forced to micromanage the
fee calculation in every case challenging a union assessment."'8 7 The court also
looked at Congressional intent in the passage of § 1983.8 Although the Ninth
Circuit lends some credence to these three public policy arguments for an exhaustion
remedy, it gives more weight to Congressional intent. Congress imposed an
exhaustion requirement for only one class of cases brought under § 1983,
specifically those brought by prisoners. 89 Focusing on Congress' intent not to
require exhaustion in other cases, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize such a
requirement in this case. 9
Likewise, the District of Columbia Circuit was faced with the exhaustion of
remedies requirement in Miller v. Air Line Pilots Ass 'n, 9' the predecessor of the
instant decision. Nonmembers of the union challenged the agency fee calculation,
and the union submitted their claim to arbitration. 92 The pilots preferred to have
their disputes aired in federal court and appealed when the district court ruled that
they had to exhaust the arbitration remedy provided before seeking judicial relief.93
The union argued that since it had developed procedural safeguards according to
Hudson, including an arbitration provision, it was inconsistent to make the union
defend itself both in arbitration and in court.94 After analyzing the progeny of cases
since Hanson, the Court opted against an exhaustion requirement. 95 "[W]e simply
see no legal basis for forcing into arbitration a party who never agreed to put his
dispute over federal law to such a process." 96 An employee is free to bring a judicial
action in federal court without first pursuing arbitration as set out in the agency fee
agreement.97
The minority circuits, including the Seventh and Tenth, required exhaustion of
the union's internal remedy before an objecting employee could proceed in court.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit was presented

84. Id. at 816.
85. Id. (citing Hudson, 475 U.S. at 311).
86. Id. (citing Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 76 F.3d 1509, 1522 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Bromley v. Michigan Educ. Ass'n, 843 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Mich. 1994))).
87. Id. (quoting Lancaster, 76 F.3d at 1522).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 108 F.3d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
92. Id. at 1416-17.
93. Id. at 1417.
94. Id. at 1418-19.
95. Id. at 1421.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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with Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union.98 Plaintiffs were nonmember teachers who
challenged the agency fee calculation and collection. 9 The plaintiffs argued that
they should be able to pursue judicial relief before submitting to the union's
arbitration process. The court rejected this argument as burdensome and
overwhelming.' 0° The Seventh Circuit, quoting the Supreme Court in Hudson, noted
that some First Amendment contexts require "swift judicial review of the challenged
government action. In this context, we do not believe that such special judicial
procedures are necessary."'' Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that a dissenting
employee must exhaust all available non-judicial remedies that are in accord with the
Hudson requirements announced by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Tenth Circuit sided with the Seventh Circuit in Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots
Ass 'n International.°2 The plaintiff brought suit against ALPA and United, his
employer, for violations of the RLA.' °3 In addressing the exhaustion requirement,
the Tenth Circuit focused heavily upon Hudson and found that its procedural scheme
necessarily implies that agency fee challenges will first be brought to the
arbitrator." ° The court cited three reasons for requiring exhaustion. First, although
the court was not bound by the concurring opinion of Justice White in Hudson, it
found the opinion carried "the same precedential weight as Supreme Court dicta to
the extent it is consistent with the majority opinion."' 5 Thus, according to White,
if the union uses arbitration as an internal remedy and the other requirements of
Hudson are met, the union should be allowed to require that the employee pursue
arbitration before seeking judicial relief." 6 Second, the court was concerned that not
requiring exhaustion would render Hudson's procedural requirements a waste of
time and money and would force the court to "micromanage the fee calculation in
every case challenging a union assessment."'01 7 Finally, the court did not want to
place itself in a position where it was entangled in union
disputes that were entirely
08
capable of being resolved outside of the courtroom.
It is with this extensive background of United States Supreme Court decisions
and the split of the circuits on the imposition of an exhaustion requirement that the
highest court in the land granted certiorari in Air Line PilotsAss "nv. Miller.

98. 922 F.2d 1306 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1230 (1991).
99. Id. at 1307.
100. Id. at 1314.
101. Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307).
102. 76 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 1514.
104. Id. at 1522.
105. Id.
106. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 311.
107. Lancaster, 76 F.3d at 1522.
108. Id.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg. The case arose as a
private sector dispute governed by the RLA.'0 9 The RLA provides for agency shop
agreements whereby "nonmembers must pay their fair share of union expenditures
'necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an
exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labormanagement issues.""'.. 0
The Court reviewed its previous rulings in the area of agency shop fees.
Previous decisions of the Court found that costs which are "unrelated to ...
representative duties may not be imposed on objecting employees.'
In Abood v.
DetroitBoard of Education, the Court stated that the agency fees could be used to
cover costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment but not for the expression of political views." 2
The Court noted that in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,"' it set out three
requirements for agency fees assessed by public unions. The fees must:
(1) be germane to collective bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the
government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding "free
riders"; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that
4
is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop."
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,'" the U.S. Supreme Court set forth three
procedural protections for nonunion workers who object to the agency fee
calculation. 6
(1) Employees must receive "sufficient information to gauge the
propriety of the union's fee""'; (2) the union must give objectors "a
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before
an impartial decision maker"" 8; (3) any amount of the objector's fee
"reasonably in dispute" must be held in escrow while the challenge is
pending.'"

109. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 869 (1998).
110. Id. at 873 (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,
448 (1984)).
111. Id. (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448-55).
112. Id. at 873-74 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225-26, 234 (1997)).
113. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
114. Miller, 523 U.S. at 874 (quoting Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519).
115. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
116. Miller, 523 U.S. at 874 (citing Hudson. 475 U.S. at 306-10).
117. Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306).
118. Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310).
119. Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310).
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In the instant decision, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the parties had not
challenged the determination of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, which held that the requirements set forth in Hudson, a20public sector case,
transfer fully to relations governed by the private sector RLA.1
In support of its position that the objectors should be required to pursue internal
union remedies prior to suing in court, ALPA advanced two arguments. First, ALPA
argued that the doctrine of discretionary exhaustion of remedies should be applied
to agency fee arbitration. 2 1 Under this doctrine, the worker would be required to
pursue the union remedy before going to court. This doctrine applies when Congress
delegates authority to a coordinate branch and ."recognizes the notion ... that
agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary
22 responsibility for the programs that
Congress has charged them to administer."1
The Court rejected this argument, finding the doctrine inapplicable to the instant
dispute because ALPA sought exhaustion of an arbitral remedy provided by a private
23
party and not an administrative remedy established by the United States Congress.1
Further, the Court found that Hudson's requirement of a swift remedial process
would increase the amount of time
weighs against an exhaustion doctrine, 2which
4
between a complaint and its resolution.1
The second argument advanced by ALPA was an efficiency argument. The
union argued that it would be difficult to hold a court hearing without a preceding
arbitration proceeding, which would flush out the specifics of the employee's
complaint. 2 The union, citing Hudson, argued that the only burden on the
nonmember is to make his objection known without specifying what was
objectionable. 126 The union was concerned with having to defend general claims in
court without specific notice about what expenditures the employee found to be
nongermane.
The Court gave little credence to ALPA's efficiency argument. Although the
union carries the burden of proving that its expenditures in the agency fee calculation
are germane, the federal court plaintiff must specify which of the figures he
opposes.'12 Hudson's requirements that employees be provided with notice of how
the fees are calculated, coupled with the opportunity for reasonable discovery at trial,
will give the employee a sufficient opportunity to specify his objections. 12 In
addition, the Court stated it was uncertain if an exhaustion requirement would lessen
the burden on the court. 129 An adverse ruling in the arbitration proceeding would
still lead the employee to the courthouse. 3 ' Furthermore, an employee may still
pursue arbitration if it is swifter and cheaper even if not required to do so.' Thus,
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Id. at 874-75 (citing Miller v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1415, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
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the Court
found that an exhaustion remedy would not relieve the burden on the
32
courts. 1

Finally, the Court recognized the union's interest in not having to defend the
agency fee calculation in two different forums, conceivably at the same time.' The
Court, however, suggested that the union can control costs by consolidating
proceedings both at the arbitration and judicial stages. 3 4 Although this concern may
be genuine, the employee's interest in pursuing the remedy of his choice, especially
when he has not specifically agreed to arbitrate, overrides the union's interests. 3
The majority opinion concluded that unless the employee agrees to arbitrate his
agency fee complaint, he may not be required to submit to arbitration before
pursuing a judicial remedy."36
B. DissentingOpinion
The dissenting opinion in this case was authored by Justice Breyer and joined
by Justice Stevens. The dissenting justices felt the correct reading of Hudson
implied approval of a union rule requiring employees to first pursue the non-binding
arbitration remedy. 37 The dissent discussed the Hudson opinion's balancing of two
interests. One interest is the union's concern that nonmembers share in the cost of
collective bargaining. 3 The other interest is the nonmember's interest in not paying
for union activities that do not advance collective bargaining.' 39
Breyer next discussed the various reasons that the union and the non-member
employees would prefer an arbitration first rule. For the union, an arbitration first
rule would lead to lower costs and would make resolution of the dispute more
manageable. 40 . Also, if the judicial and arbitration proceedings occur
simultaneously, the judge and arbitrator could come to differing conclusions which
would itself be expensive and burdensome.' 41 On the part of the objecting employee,
there are many reasons to encourage an arbitration first rule including: the unlikely
chance that serious delay will occur, the opportunity of a favorable result in
arbitration, the non-binding nature of the decision if it is unfavorable, and the escrow
holding of any fees collected while arbitration is occurring so the employee does not
lose any money. 42 From the viewpoint of the dissent, arbitration first is resourceful.
"Insofar as it settles matters to the parties' satisfaction, it avoids unnecessary,
perhaps time consuming, judicial investigation of highly complex union accounts
and expense allocations."' 43
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Finally, Breyer focused on problems he found in the majority opinion. First, the
subject of consent to arbitration has no place in the resolution of this issue.'" The
arbitration first rule is grounded, not in consent, but in the Hudson opinion, which
45
authorizes and requires internal procedures be developed to collect agency fees.
This is not unlike local court rules which require parties to attempt non-binding
1 46
arbitration before their case proceeds in court. This is not an issue of consent but
rather of a mandate from a prior decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Second,
arbitration first is not equivalent to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine but is rather
an extension of the holding in Hudson. 47 Breyer questions why exhaustion of
remedies should prevent the court from elaborating on Hudson 's requirements by
establishing an arbitration first rule, when exhaustion did not factor into Hudson's
48
initial requirement of a speedy resolution of objections to the agency fee.1 Third,
Breyer addressed a partial solution to the problem which the majority failed to
consider. If courts were to defer until the rendering of an arbitration decision, the
court could "take advantage of any settlement or narrowing of the issues that the
nonmandatory arbitration proceeding produced."'' 49 For the dissenting justices, the
arbitration first rule is a reasonable extension of the Supreme Court's decision in
Hudson.5 0

V. COMMENT
Beginning in 1956, the United States Supreme Court began addressing the issue
of agency shop agreements and has continually upheld their constitutionality. Each
decision of the court builds on prior decisions, attempting to fill in gaps or
uncertainties in this area of the law. Important issues in the early history of the
agency shop agreement centered around the use of nonmember fees for political
activities, such as supporting a candidate, a political party, or a particular issue. This
led the Court to draw a distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of
the agency shop fees. Conflicts between nonmember employees and unions arose
often over the classification of expenses as "germane (or not germane) to collective
bargaining." This encouraged the Court to develop tests to determine which
expenses could be assessed to nonmember employees. In the landmark case of
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, the Court laid out three procedural requirements
to be used to protect nonmembers objecting to an agency shop fee. The third
requirement forced the union to provide an internal remedy for the settlement of
these disputes.' The majority in Hudson, however, failed to discuss the question
of whether an employee must first pursue this internal remedy or if he could
immediately file suit in court. In his concurring opinion, Justice White called for an
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exhaustion requirement, but the issue was left open for resolution in a future case.
The federal appellate courts split on an exhaustion requirement, making it virtually
necessary for the Supreme Court to revisit the issue again.
When the Court granted certiorari in Air Line Pilots Ass "n v. Miller,'52 the issue
of exhaustion was ripe for consideration. The Court's decision affirmed the
employee's right to pursue a judicial remedy without first participating in union
controlled arbitration proceedings. The Court's holding in Miller recognized that
nonmember employees who have not agreed to arbitrate their agency fee disputes
cannot be compelled to do so by the union.
The agency shop agreement itself is a compromise between competing values
of the union as collective representative and the employee. Because of its basic
structure, the union represents every employee within a particular line of work,
regardless of whether the employee chooses to join the union. In order to address
the problem of "free riders," the unions use the agency shop agreement to insure that
all who receive the benefit of collective representation provide financial support.
However, the employee is concerned about being forced to support causes in which
he does not believe. In fact, the employee may have chosen not to join the union
because of the views it espouses. As Thomas Jefferson once said, "to compel a man
to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."' 53
The Hudson procedural requirements were instituted to protect the worker's
rights and interests while at the same time allowing the union to collect these fees.
The requirement that the union provide objectors with "a reasonably prompt
opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker"
created problems when employees instead wanted to pursue their rights in federal
court. 54 Competing policy interests for both employees and unions have played a
substantial role for the federal courts when trying to determine whether to require
exhaustion of the union's arbitral remedy before an employee can bring suit.
There are five major policy arguments in favor of an exhaustion requirement.
First, if employees were not required to arbitrate first, "the procedure spawned by
the Supreme Court [in Hudson would be] largely a waste of time and money."'55
Second, the federal courts would be forced to "micromanage" fee calculations,
placing a tremendous burden on the courts. 56 Third, the court would be involving
itself in disputes that very easily could have been resolved by the union on its own
without judicial intervention. 5 7 Fourth,

152. 523 U.S. 866 (1998).
153. Bromley v. Michigan Educ. Ass'n, 82 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 1996).
154. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307.
155. Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 76 F.3d 1509, 1522 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bromley
v. Michigan Educ. Ass'n, 843 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).
156. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union, 922 F.2d 1306, 1314 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1230 (1991).
157. Lancaster,76 F.3d at 1522 (citing Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961)).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1999/iss2/3

14

Ahrens: Ahrens: Non-Union Member Complaints to Calculation of Agency Shop Fees:
1999] Non-Union Member Complaints... Arbitration or JudicialRelief?

187

[t]he possibility that corrective action within the union will render a
member's complaint moot suggests that, in the interest of conserving
judicial resources, no court step in before the union is given its
opportunity. Moreover, courts may fird valuable the assistance provided
58
by prior consideration of issues by appellate union tribunals.'
Finally, the union may find itself forced to defend its calculation in both a judicial
and an arbitral forum, quite possibly at the same time, if it institutes arbitration
proceedings upon receiving a complaint and another employee immediately sues in
court." 9 This could be expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful for the union, and
it can also lead to quite different decisions by the arbitrator and judge.
Four arguments can be made against an exhaustion requirement. The first, and
probably weakest, argument is that the burden on the court system will not
necessarily be reduced. "To the extent that the arbitrator does not sustain an
objection to the union's fee calculation, exhaustion would require the objector to
traverse two layers of procedure rather than one."' 6 ° Second, if the union's internal
remedy is indeed "an inexpensive, swift, and sure remedy for agency-fee errors,
dissenting employees may avail themselves of that process even if not required to
do so., , 16 1 In response to the two-fora argument for an exhaustion requirement, the
third argument against an exhaustion requirement suggests that unions can reduce
the expense of multiple fee calculation complaints by consolidating both the
arbitration and judicial proceedings into one action.'62 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, an employee should not be required to arbitrate a dispute that he never
agreed to arbitrate.'63
The policy arguments both for and against an exhaustion requirement are strong.
However, the Supreme Court in Millerpresented persuasive reasoning for preserving
an employee's right to pursue a judicial remedy before seeking an arbitral remedy.
This decision is a natural extension of the Court's holding in Hudson. Hudson's
internal remedy requirement is meant to protect objecting employees by offering
them an opportunity to air their grievances in a timely fashion in front of a neutral
decision-maker. It is not meant to compel them to do so. The Court recognized the
Union's interest in an arbitration first rule, but it found that this interest does not
outweigh the nonmember's interest (1) in avoiding arbitration of disputes they didn't
agree to arbitrate and (2) in "electing to proceed immediately to court for
adjudication of their federal rights."'"
Justice Breyer's dissent attempts to point out flaws in the majority opinion;
however, his argument boils down to two main points. First, an arbitration first rule
is good for both the nonmember employee and the union. 65 Second, if the Court is
going to mandate union compliance with the intricate requirements of Hudson, it
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should accord a union the right to insist upon the employee's compliance with them
as well.66 Although there is some merit in these arguments, the overriding purpose
behind the Supreme Court's opinion in Hudson is to protect the rights and interests
of the dissenting employee who objects to the agency fee calculation. This includes
the employee's right to pursue the remedy of his choice, especially when he has not
consented to arbitrate that particular dispute.
The effect of the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller is to dispel any doubt as to
the proper method of objecting to agency fee calculations. While the union is still
required to provide internal remedies, such as arbitration, the nonmember employee
has the option of choosing a judicial or an arbitral remedy. Employees can decide
for themselves which forum will best meet their needs and which will produce the
best results. Unions will have an incentive to install internal remedies that are
inexpensive, quick, and fair in the hope that employees will willingly choose that
course of action. This rule is also consistent with policy espoused in other areas of
arbitration, specifically in the realm of mandatory arbitration provisions for
employment disputes in CBAs. While there is a strong federal policy in favor of
arbitrating employment disputes, the courts will not force employees to arbitrate
those disputes that they have not voluntarily and expressly agreed to arbitrate. This
bright line rule clears up confusion not only within the lower federal courts, but also
within the workplace.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller clarifies much of the
confusion that existed within this area of the law. While Miller does strike a balance
between the interests of the employee and the union, the Court clearly favors the
employee's interests more heavily. From a policy standpoint, this decision is sound.
First, the Court authorized the collection of agency fees from nonmember
employees; none of these employees agreed to pay the fee. They pay the fee because
it is required. These nonmembers have simply chosen employment that is
represented by a union they do not want to join. In order to assist unions in
combating the free rider problem, the Court has, in essence, ordered each of these
employees to either pay the agency fee or quit their job. However, in not requiring
the employees to pursue the arbitration remedy first, the Court is also protecting the
nonmember employee. The employee is ordered to pay the fee but will not be forced
to arbitrate his fee objections if he does not specifically agree to do so.
Second, the Court recognizes the unequal power distribution between a union
and an employee. Under Hudson, a union is required to develop internal remedies
to expeditiously settle fee disputes. While the remedy must be neutral, it is,
nevertheless, developed for and operated by the union. The Miller decision is a
triumph for the nonmember employee, who can now decide for himself which
forum, the union's home court or a court of law, will successfully resolve the dispute
he has over the fee he is ordered to pay.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Air Line PilotsAss 'n v. Miller,
was to clear up an area of the law that had caused considerable disagreement among
workers, unions, and the courts. Absent an express agreement to arbitrate agency fee
disputes, an objecting employee will not be required to pursue arbitration first.
Instead, if the employee objects to the calculation or collection of the agency shop
fee, the employee may immediately proceed to a judicial resolution of the grievance.
ANN E. AHRENS
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